Now that term is over, its time to do some serious thinking. I've been working on a chapter on John Locke's theory of will in The Essay Concerning Human Understanding for my PhD Thesis. The chapter is nearly finished now, but I have recently discovered a book which I feared replicated much of what I wanted to say. I'm not going to name it or the author yet because my thoughts about it are far to provisional.
Luckily (and in the end not surprisingly) the book is not nearly the threat I perceived it to be. While philosophically interesting, and often plausible, the argument doesn't seem to interface with the Locke's thought. The interpretation is in terms of contemporary debates on will. Much of these debates are more or less similar to their predecessors in the late 17th century, but not entirely. In fact, when one gets down to the brass tacks, the differences are quite surprising. While some of the issues are the same, their occurrence in 17th century discussions is for different reasons. So while the book I'm reading at the moment, often seems to get a good sense of Locke's meaning, it lacks precession. It fails to accept the specific purposiveness Locke envisioned for different categories human agency. It seems to miss the nuances, the directionality, of Locke's though.
Most importantly it lacks a sense of the historical context of Locke's work. The author's interpretive methodology begins with what we (or at least what he presumes we) expect a free agent to possess. It is not just the freedom to do things without external constraint. It involves something extra, which he describes as the "elusive something." (he says this after saying, in terms not at all elusive, of what this consists). The problem is he never begins with what Locke might envision. Now what Locke expects a free, rational, adult agent to possess may very well be the same thing we do, but that is a historically contingent possibility. Locke may have subtly or radically different views than author as to what freedom entails. But if the author looks for his elusive something in Locke's text, when he finds it it will be, of methodological necessity, read into Locke rather than interpreted out of the book. What the author finds may end up agreeing with what Locke purports, but only through historical chance.
This unwillingness to grapple alongside Locke with the concerns, questions, and ideas that were incorporated into Locke's Essay in the first place is reflected in a disjunction in terminology. The author seems to spend little effort coming to serious grips with Locke's sense of terminology in the account of will. Because of this the author tends to muddle up freedom and will. Certainly they are tangentially connected, but Locke did his best to separate these terms for a reason. The very act of looking for Locke's account of "fully fledged free agency" as the author does, is to ignore the fact that volition, not freedom, is Locke's primary concern. What men call the freedom of the will is revealed in the way the will can work, but it is always wrongly called a freedom. The author sometimes acknowledges this, but it doesn't seem to affect his terms of analysis.
Furthermore, the author misses out the sense in which a good deal of Locke's discussion is terminological. What kind of terms and ideas can the mind form when it first learns about volition? What kind of terms, and discourses add up to nonsense speech? These are crucial for understanding Locke's over all purpose, and the distinctive turn he makes toward analyzing the will in a more metaphysical and psychological sense.
Having finished putting these thoughts to ether (not really paper eh), I feel a good deal more secure. I'm not going to be caught out on Locke's theory of will. I have a unique but grounded interpretation which isn't duplicated elsewhere. This brings great joy to the heart of a PhD student. Huzzah!
Once more into the breach,
Ben
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